Leaders of the business and investment communities gathered at the London Stock Exchange last week to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the UK Corporate Governance Code and the pioneering role of Sir Adrian Cadbury’s committee in launching Britain’s comply or explain approach to governance. Yet there are those who wonder whether there is much to celebrate in the light of recent governance scandals.
This, I feel, is too harsh, for the code, now under the aegis of the Financial Reporting Council, played a crucial role in the professionalisation of British boards and has for that reason been a successful export to other countries. As Sir Adrian pointed out, only half the top 250 companies had audit committees back in 1992. Fewer still had nomination and remuneration committees.
There was a fundamental failure, he said, to distinguish governance, which is a responsibility of the board, from management, whose job is to turn purpose into action. And he rightly placed emphasis on how formalising the board appointment process helped dispel a clubby ethos. The subtlety of the market-oriented comply or explain formula ensured that business leaders went along with all-important proposals such as the split of the chairman and chief executive roles.
That said, the limits to the code’s achievements are today painfully clear. The biggest failure concerns remuneration, where the formalisation of boardroom pay setting led to a ratchet whereby non-executives never feel that their chief executive is third or fourth quartile material and chief executives who are not primarily motivated by money nonetheless want pay that looks good in relation to their peers. The sheer complexity and flawed metrics that characterise so many incentive schemes cannot be blamed on the code. But there is no question that this is the biggest area of unfinished business in corporate governance in the English-speaking world.
Another problem lies in the poor quality of the explanations for non-compliance with the code, especially lower down the corporate scale. Too many investors operate on a comply or else basis. Meantime, the FRC’s Stewardship Code has a long way to go before asset managers abide by its spirit and pension fund trustees focus less on narrow financial yardsticks, such as quarterly performance numbers, and more on longer run performance, broadly defined.
Perhaps the most dispiriting feature today is the number of governance failures that have taken place recently of the kind that the code is supposed to address. The board weaknesses exposed at Barclays, for example, partly boiled down to an over-dominant chief executive, in the shape of Bob Diamond. To a degree, BP’s troubles in the Gulf of Mexico and at Texas City reflected the same syndrome during Lord Browne’s long tenure as chief executive. As for insurerAviva, that is a case of unarrested decline against a background of dispersed ownership.
If there is an area next to remuneration where governance practice needs improvement, it is internal governance below board level and the structure of incentives in the company. BP’s problems reflected flawed incentives on safety issues and a failure to translate principles enunciated at board level into the heart of the organisation. So, too, with the banks ripping off their customers with products such as payment protection insurance. Non-executives and shareholders in their dialogue with boards need to devote more attention to the sticks and carrots that drive behaviour.
Yet this raises questions about the limits of what any code can achieve. No code can ensure leadership in the boardroom or ethical leadership, although a formal nomination process provides a framework in which such goals can more readily be achieved. Nor can a code produce an ethical corporation. Yet in the light of what has happened in banking, an ethical deficit is one of the most serious problems in corporate governance. There are also issues of integrity in the audit area. The commercialisation of the audit profession has led to an ethos at the big professional firms that puts insufficient emphasis on their public interest remit. It takes more than code requirements on conflicts of interest to overturn that culture.
It remains important to recognise that no system of governance will ever be foolproof. Because success in preventing corporate disaster is unmeasurable, the positive achievements of governance cannot be fully known. And the fact that the British code has been such a successful export suggests a marked lack of appetite around the world for heavy-handed regulation. The need is thus for a continuing effort on the part of everyone from management to pension fund trustees to raise their game. The Cadbury committee started a process. It remains a work in progress.
来源:ft.com
