公司治理与风险管理角色冲突中的内部审计研究


更新时间:2012/01/25 阅读次数:1547

关键字:内部审计角色间冲突角色内冲突实验研究

摘要/Abstract

现代内部审计基于董事会和管理层的需要,在公司治理和风险管理中发挥作用,而双重领导易使内
 部审计陷入角色冲突,对内部审计能否胜任两种责任提出了质疑。以内部审计双重领导为背景,基于角色
 冲突的视角,探讨内部审计面临的角色间冲突和角色内冲突及其后果,并构建内部审计的双重委托代理实
 验进行检验。研究结果表明,双向报告下角色间冲突和角色内冲突普遍存在,尤其是当总经理为机会主义
 类型时,两种角色冲突出现的可能性更大;而且角色冲突降低了内部审计的质量,表现为角色间冲突使内
 部审计很难同时完成治理任务和风险管理任务,显著降低了两种任务的努力程度,角色内冲突破坏了内部
 审计治理任务的独立性,降低了治理任务的努力程度。研究贡献在于将内部审计的两种责任纳入同一研究
 框架,从角色冲突的视角考察内部审计的效率,丰富了内部审计的研究成果。

Modern internal audit play an important role in corporate governance and enterprise risk
 management based on the requirement of Board of Directors and Management, but it easy to make the
 internal audit into role conflict under the dual leadership. Using the dual leadership of internal audit as
 research back ground, this study analyzes the interrole conflict and intrarole conflict of internal audit and
 its consequence from the role conflict perspective. By the method of experimental economics, the results
 indicate that the interrole conflict and intrarole conflict are widespread; especially when the General
 Manager is opportunistic. Furthermore, the interrole conflict reduces the effort of two tasks significantly,
 and the intrarole conflict undermines the independence of internal audit, reduces the effort of governance
 task. The contribution of this study is that it brings the two responsibility of internal audit into the same
 research framework, and that it investigates the efficiency of internal audit from the perspective of role
 conflict, which enriches the extant research of internal audit.