政治关联、寻租环境与民营企业融资约束


更新时间:2011/09/05 阅读次数:1264

作者:李莉1, 薛冬辉2

关键字:政治关联 寻租环境 融资约束 民营企业

摘要/Abstract

FHP从信息不对称角度解释了融资约束的存在,但在如我国这样非市场化资源配置环境中,政治关联是通过降低企业与金融机构间的信息不对称程度还是通过企业和政府官员间的寻租机制影响民营企业所受融资约束仍有待考察。本文首次从寻租视角,以构建博弈模型的方式,研究政治关联影响融资约束的机制,并创造性地设计实证方法以在管制行业内经营的民营企业为样本对理论推导结果加以检验。本文认为在我国政治关联主要通过寻租机制降低民营企业的融资约束程度,且在非市场化资源配置地区,在管制行业内经营的民营企业无论是否政治关联都可以因使用寻租手段而不受融资约束;在市场化资源配置地区,政治关联因可降低寻租成本而使民营企业不受融资约束。

FHP explains the existence of financing constraint from the perspective of information asymmetry. But in non-market resource allocation environment like China, it is to be discussed that whether political relation reduces the information asymmetry between enterprises and financial institutions or through power rent-seeking between executives and government officials, to influence the constraint of private enterprise. From rent-seeking perspective, this paper studies the mechanism between political relation and financing constraint by building game theory model, and with the sample of enterprises in regulated industries, creatively designs empirical method to verify the theoretical results. This paper believes that political relation reduces the financing constraint of private enterprise by rent-seeking mechanism. In non-market resource allocation area, private enterprise in regulated industries could avoid financing constraint by rent-seeking no matter it has political relation. In market resource allocation area, political relation could reduce the cost of rent-seeking to make private enterprise to avoid financing constraints.