DB to DC: The Corporate Governance Connection


更新时间:2005/02/20 阅读次数:280

According to a poll by the Public Policy Institute of California (a moderate think-tank), 61% of California adults, + or - 2%, favor changing the pension systems for new public employees from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) systems similar to a 401(k) plan, while 25% oppose such a change. (Pension crossroads, Sacramento Bee, 1/27/05) There are few rational arguments in favor of such a change. Requiring two systems during a forty-year phase-out won't save taxpayers money. It will result in lower retirement benefits for the vast majority of new public employees. Public employment will be far less attractive, so levels of service will continue to deteriorate. And, it will wipe out inflation fighting pension protection for existing employees. So why the proposal?

One obvious reason is that some people want a feeding frenzy. It costs 0.18% to administer the DB plan under CalPERS but will probably cost more than 1-2% per year as a DC plan. If California funds have assets of approximately $500 billion (CalPERS and CalSTRS alone have $300 billion), the yield to money managers will be $5-10 billion.

Secondly, as New York Times columnist John Broder recently noted, "The outcome of the vote in California, pension experts and political analysts say, will not only have an impact on the state pension system, but will also provide an important marker of public opinion on proposed changes to Social Security." (Schwarzenegger Aims At State Pension System, 1/23/05) Help President Bush achieve Social Security reform and maybe Bush will see to it that California gets more than 77 cents for each dollar of taxes sent to Washington.

Third, Schwarzenegger raised more than $23 million in political donations in 2004, using the money for initiative campaigns, travel - and fundraising. The DB to DC initiative will help him raise a fortune - at least $50 million to fund his 2005 initiatives and another $50 for his reelection campaign. And the amount to be raised for initiatives may be understated, since these are not subject to the reelection campaign limits of $22,300 per donor.

However, another huge reason is the role CalPERS, CalSTRS and other public funds have taken in corporate governance. As Jon Coupal, president of the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association said, the proposal seeks to end "the social engineering and corporate governance agenda” of CalPERS (State workers balk at taking another hit, Sacramento Bee, 1/11/05)

Why do powerful forces want to end traditional pension funds, especially public pension funds? Because pension funds are the primary check on the power and greed of corporate CEOs.

In 1932, researchers Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means documented that widespread stock ownership had shifted control of corporations from owners to managers. Being an active shareholder no longer paid because, despite potential gains to shareholders as a group, it was no longer rational for any one shareholder to monitor and act. Why shoulder the entire expense of corporate activism for only a small portion of the gains while other shareholders get a "free ride?"

With few options left to them, dissatisfied owners were told by the system to love it or leave. That strategy became known as the "Wall Street Walk" or the "Wall Street Rule." Enter defined benefit pension funds. Their share of the market rose from 0.8% in 1950 to 9.4% (1970), to 18.5% (1980), to 28% (1990) and stands above 30% today. This shift set the stage for the rise of public pension funds to become watchdogs for good corporate governance. Private pension funds have too many conflicts of interest to take on that role.

CalPERS' involvement with corporate governance issues can be traced back to 1984 when California's Treasurer, Jesse Unruh learned that Texaco had repurchased almost 10% of its own stock from the Bass brothers at a $137 million premium. Essentially, Texaco's management paid "greenmail" to avoid loss of their jobs in a takeover. CalPERS, a substantial shareholder, wasn't given the same option. Unruh quickly organized a powerful shareholder's rights movement with the creation of the Council of Institutional Investors (CII - composed mostly of public pension funds) to fight for fair treatment of shareholders, shareholder approval of certain corporate decisions, and needed regulatory reforms.

A 1991 study found that over 80% of corporate board candidates were filled by CEO recommendations. Until 1992, when the SEC revised its proxy rules under pressure from CalPERS, shareholders could not even communicate with each other without going through elaborate and expensive filing procedures. What followed was a period of sweeping and highly visible change in boardrooms across America due to the activism of CalPERS and CII. CEOs were ousted at American Express, Chrysler, General Motors, IBM, Kodak and Westinghouse.

A 1995 study by Steven Nesbitt, of Wilshire Associates, examined the performance of 42 companies targeted by CalPERS. It found the stock price of these companies trailed the S&P 500 Index by 66% in the five-year period before CalPERS acted to achieve governance reforms. The same firms outperformed the Index by 52.5% in the following five years. A similar independent study by Michael P. Smith, with Economic Analysis Corporation, concluded that corporate governance activism has increased the value of CalPERS' holdings in 34 firms over the 1987-93 period by $19 million at a monitoring cost of $3.5 million.

After the demise of Enron, Worldcom, and others in 2002, CalPERS experienced another surge in corporate governance activism. Despite Sarbanes-Oxley, corporate governance concerns persist. Investors are now supposed to be protected from greedy CEOs by “independent” board members who will negotiate the terms of employment at arms length. But under current listing standards directors can still be considered independent even if they receive $60,000 to 100,000 a year in additional compensation. They can be the CEOs golfing buddies or former college roommates. Even if they start out as independent, most directors end up loyal to the CEO because they set the agenda and provide the perks. Forget about independence. Directors need to be dependent on shareholders.

There are many avenues of corporate governance reform, but for many of us the Holy Grail is proxy access for the purpose of nominating directors. Management controls the proxy machinery. Challenging incumbents requires substantial legal fees and mailing a separate ballot to all shareholders. Additionally, many corporate elections are not confidential. Management sees how shareholders vote and puts pressure on money managers to change their vote. Not voting for management could cost them business, like being able to service the company employee 401(k) accounts.

In the summer of 2002
Les Greenberg and I petitioned the SEC for proxy access. Our petition "re-energized" the "debate over shareholder access to management proxy cards to nominate directors,” according to CII (see Equal Access - What Is It?) Nine months later the AFL-CIO filed a similar petition. Finally, in October 20003 the SEC proposed a weak rule that would make it easier for shareholders to nominate a token number of directors, which they predicted might happen at 45, or 0.3%, of companies each year.

This “foot in the door” supported by CalPERS, CalSTRS, and public pension funds all over the nation so disturbed corporate CEOs that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce threatened to sue the SEC if the rule is enacted. The Business Roundtable, made up exclusively of top CEOs, placed ads in major newspapers signed by chief executives of 40 large corporations, warning the proposal would erode the independence of directors. But not being independent of shareholders is not a problem. In fact, that is the solution.

Throughout the summer of 2004, SEC Chairman William Donaldson kept announcing he would push forward: "The need for action," he said, "can't stop for partisan politics.” (Fortune, September 20, 2004) Yet, during President Bush's innately appealing discussions of an “ownership society,” he consistently failed the perfect opportunity to signal to shareholders that he endorses the idea of giving them a greater stake in selecting corporate directors…of taking an ownership role in corporate governance.

Many have taken this as a sign that it is now time for CEOs to begin pushing back. "Like Donald Trump after a long day of watching tycoon wannabes struggle to gain his approval, CalPERS board members are trying to hand out pink slips to the directors at 90% of the companies in which the fund owns shares," began an article posted on the Republican Party's website entitled "CalPERS Puts Social Agenda Ahead of Profit."

Yes, as I have indicated in these columns before, CalPERS' corporate governance and “social agenda” need some fine-tuning but they're not doing badly. In fact, last year the System's top performing portfolio was its investment in activist corporate governance funds, which earned 53.5%. Try doing that with your 401(k). I say, if CalPERS can earn good returns with collateral benefits, that's a plus. For example, their real estate loans to members have earned about 20% a year since the early 1990s.

CalPERS has been a leader in the effort to bring accountability to corporate boardrooms. In November 2004 they announced their next major target - CEO pay. Under the plan, CalPERS will pursue six major pay-for-performance initiatives over the next three years. They include:

  • Submitting a comprehensive proposal to the SEC in 2005 that calls for greater transparency of compensation packages;
  • Strengthening listing standards at the securities exchanges and self-regulatory organizations to promote greater communication and transparency between listed companies and investors;
  • Urging the compensation consulting industry to adopt practices that better align boards and management with shareowners;
  • Targeting a limited number of corporations in 10 market sectors with the worst compensation practices to move their executive compensation philosophy and practice toward greater pay-for-performance concepts;
  • Publicly withholding support from a focused list of certain corporate compensation committee members who develop and support egregious pay packages; and
  • Recognizing companies and individuals who use superior pay-for-performance practices.

Past experience has shown that such a program will not only help grow CalPERS' portfolio, it will also lower the cost of executive compensation and make pay more performance-sensitive.

In closing, it is ironic to note that while CEOs are orchestrating the attack on CalPERS, guess what kind of retirement plans they have? All of the CEOs in the S&P ExecuComp database have defined benefit plans. Of course, qualified pension plans (exempt from taxation) are limited to about $200,000 a year and the average S&P 500 CEO earns $2 million (not including camouflaged payments). Supplemental executive retirement plans, known as SERPs, are an inefficient way to compensate CEOs but they come with one great benefit - camouflage. “Neither the increase in value of the SERP plan before retirement nor the amount of payments after retirement appears in the compensation tables, the existence of SERPs, and the formulas under which payouts are made must be disclosed in the firm's SEC filings.” (Bacchus and Fried,
Pay Without Performance) Killing public pension funds will allow CEOs to wield power without accountability.