As the proportion of independent, outside directors on a board and its oversight committees increases, the likelihood of corporate fraud decreases, according to a study of U.S. companies published in the June issue of Financial Analysts Journal, a research publication for investment practitioners worldwide published by CFA Institute. The study also found that companies that had a board compensation committee tended to be more likely to commit or be accused of fraud - although, the fewer ties compensation committee members had with the company and its executives, the less likelihood there was of corporate fraud.
Compared to the non-fraud companies, companies accused of committing fraud:
- Had a lower percentage of outside directors
- Had a lower percentage of independent directors
- Were less likely to have an audit committee of the board
- Were more likely to have a compensation committee of the board
- Had a lower level of independence on audit, compensation and nominating committees .
Their results support NYSE and NASDAQ requirements for independent directors and Sarbanes-Oxley Act requirements for audit committees. Regarding their finding that companies accused of fraud were more likely to have a compensation committee, the authors write, "The implication is that compensation committees have been ineffective in evaluating and properly rewarding the performance of top executives. They may also have designed compensation packages with dysfunctional incentives."
Composition of the compensation committee was a significant mitigating factor. The more independent directors on the committee were of any other business or personal ties with the company, the less likelihood there was of corporate fraud.
The researchers did not find statistically significant differences between the fraud and no-fraud groups when they tested for:
- board size
- frequency of board meetings
- frequency of audit, compensation and nominating committee meetings
- existence of a nominating committee
- financial performance of the company
- the length of time that the CEO had served on the board
- whether the president or CEO also served as chairman of the board.
The authors conclude that "the influence of the CEO on the board does not detract from its effectiveness in monitoring for fraud."
