The Cost of Entrenched Boards


更新时间:2004/07/01 阅读次数:155

Lucian Bebchuk and Alma Cohen investigated empirically how the value of publicly traded firms is affected by arrangements protecting management from removal. A majority of U.S. public companies have staggered boards that substantially insulate the board from removal via a hostile takeover or a proxy contest. (Program on Corporate Governance, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Harvard Law School, Olin Paper No. 478) They find that:

  1. Staggered boards are associated with an economically significant reduction in firm value (as measured by Tobin's Q);
  2. There is evidence consistent with staggered boards' bringing about, and not merely reflecting, a lower firm value; and
  3. The correlation with reduced firm value is stronger for staggered boards established in the corporate charter (which shareholders cannot amend) than for staggered boards established in company bylaws (which can be amended by shareholders).