Capitalism is Not for Sissies


更新时间:2004/04/02 阅读次数:162

I advise readers to listen directly to the SEC’s Security Holder Director Nominations Roundtable. Below are a few largely unedited scribbles and snippets, mostly in my own words, of what several participants brought to the forum.

Nell Minow (The Corporate Library) There is no way to determine true independence but we can determine who invites you onto the board…who you dance with. We will not have genuine independence until you let shareholders play a role. We need a market test for directors. The goal of corporate governance is achieve a series of checks and balance to obtain credibility for capitalism. A director who got a bad grade called. I told him he had a resolution that passed by 60% that they didn't implement. Nell, I’m glad you brought that up; “those are fringe shareholders.” We have had “independent directors” for a long time; we need genuinely independent directors put to a market test. “Capitalism is not for sissies.” “If this be shareholder treason, then make the most of it.” (Ms. Minow always has the most quotable quote and the most delightful laugh.)

Martin Lipton (Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz) Fundamental goal of corporations is to produce goods and service. It’s too easy to say we need additional fixes. I think we’ve already done that. Give the new requirements a chance to work. Most corporations aren’t ignoring shareholder wishes. Communications with institutional shareholders are having a major impact. This proposal is a serious mistake to take this step at this time. We haven’t had an opportunity to test recently enacted requirements. Potential directors don’t want to serve because they don’t want to be involved in contentious proxy contests. I think it is working just fine but of course you can find occasional situations where shareholders are ignored.

Lucian Arye Bebchuk (Harvard Law School) Good corporate governance is an instrument for achieving higher long-term shareholder value. Most of the time is not always. That’s why we need a safety valve. Mere independence will not ensure the directors will be well selected and have the right incentives.

Randall S. Kroszner (Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago) How do we enhance shareholder value? Make sure corporation is credible so it can raise capital at a lower rate. There is mixed data on independent directors. Proposal may not help that much on this margin. Allow new rules to work out. Instead of new rules, look at old rules. Look at anti-trust, short swing rules, ERISA, etc. that may block more activity by institutional investors.

Richard H. Moore (State of North Carolina) Ninth largest public pension fund in the country. I can’t think of any instance where our 30-year timeframe interests are out of alignment with increasing shareholder value. This is about the preservation of majority rights. Loss of checks where people are spending other people’s money…not unlike unchecked government. 78% of our funds are indexed or enhanced indexes.

Steve Odland (AutoZone Inc. – Business Roundtable) We’ve be appalled by the scandals. Objective is positive but compared the rule with one company invading another and then talking. When we wrote our corporate governance guidelines three years ago there were none to copy and no one had ever heard of corporate governance. (Ed. He should have looked on our internet site eight years ago...the subject is hardly a new one.) A very small number of shareholders would like to impose their will on the majority. We should let independent boards do their work. Are we trying to fix the issues of a few years ago or the entirely different process we have now? I think that boards are listening today not because of anything done in Washington but because they want to do the right thing. All the rules haven’t even gone into effect and there are major changes.

Eric Roiter (General Counsel, Fidelity Management & Research Company) This is a modest proposal as a means to an end. However, it is only one means and there are others. Apears to advocate greater use of the Wall Street rule of dumping unfavorable stocks. The strength of our capital markets is the depth of liquidity of secondary markets. Urges a broader view.

Damon Silvers ( AFL-CIO) The board has a legal duty to the corporation and its shareholders to serve a higher purpose…the creation of wealth, jobs, goods and services. Corporation should not be turned into a vehicle for some to enrich themselves at the expense of everyone else. Indexed funds look a lot like the corporation and its shareholders and should get access to the ballot. The current system allows expensive control contests and the choice of walking away. Neither choice is palatable to long-term indexed shareholders. The other alternative is the shareholder resolution but in most cases they are only advisory. This proposal has increased responsiveness in corporations but that responsiveness may vaporize if it is not enacted.

Ralph V. Whitworth (Relational Investors) Triggering mechanisms will cause more distraction because they have thresholds lower than 5%. At Apria, we said if the nominee didn’t receive 25% they wouldn’t be eligible for 3 years. Look to the other end of the process for additional limitations.

Wallison (American Enterprise Institute) The rule creates a vehicle for special interests. Shareholders are really interested in increasing shareholder value not shareholder dissatisfaction. What we should have is something to address the failure of a company to match its peers in profitability, not current triggers. We need a much more narrowly focused rule, if any. Implication, maximization of value is the shareholder's only legitimate interest. (The proposal leaves to shareholders what their interests are.) Shareholders who are dissatisfied should sell their stock.

Richard C. Breeden (Richard C. Breeden & Co.) Would agree with need to allow states to remain vital in business governance. Accused others of the Marie Antoinette school of governance; if you don’t like company sell and buy a house in Beverly Hills.

Charles M. Elson (University of Delaware) Rule will not promote the interests of particular groups because you have to get elected by majority. Short slates have often achieved results. Proposal makes sense. Quibble is with the approach. Solution is independent nominating committees, access to the proxy and the way we pay for the contests. Create a state approved process to allow short slate to get their expenses paid for if they win or a proportion if they lose but win a substantial vote.

Joseph A. Grundfest (Stanford Law School) Slow is bad; complexity is bad. Goal of shareholder community is to get the company to address their concerns. Proposes advice and consent mechanism. Senate has to confirm. Board nominates...if director elected without a majority vote federal rules can disable that director. Forces consultation and cooperation.

Ira M. Millstein (Weil, Gotshal & Manges) Simplicity is important. Shareholders have no voice in the election of directors because of plurality vote and withhold votes that are basically advisory. Shareholders can’t cause anything to happen. Make it a new listing requirement that every director must win a majority of votes to be elected, with withheld votes counting against the candidate. This would force boards to take action, whether by negotiating with shareholders, calling for a new election, or asking the director to resign. What’s a matter with that as a first step? Editor: Do both.

Donaldson. If we have a hundred voters and 99 vote withhold, they’re still elected. We haven’t really had (legitimate) elections. Shareholders feel that they’ve never really participated in an election.

J. Carter Beese, Jr. (Riggs Capital Partners) Board meetings are now different. We should at least understand what has changed before we move on to the next phase of regulation. Many more potential directors are turning down positions. Individual director liability is coming soon. Seeking redress from individual directors. Role prone to unintended consequences. Would enhance gaming of the market by hedge funds. Something needs to be done to get shareholders involved in voting. Should be able to vote for individual directors. Institutional investors are not serving well by not voting. Activists can swing because others don’t participate.

Franklin D. Raines (Fannie Mae) If it effectively targeted unresponsive companies, we wouldn’t have a problem. However, this proposal reaches well beyond that. Corporations are not governments. We want them to be risk-takers. What role should there be for advisory firms? Should a fiduciary be able to delegate their vote to such advisors? SEC has under-estimated costs because everyone will want their bets covered. Better to have already have triggered to cut out a year in the process. Companies have a fiduciary responsibility to spend money to elect candidates they have endorsed. Leverage issues…causes. People will do whatever they can to advance their cause. Often ask company to produce a report. Companies will spend a lot of time in responding to human health problems, environmental issues, etc. to ensure no disruption. Folly not to recognize that reforms have happened. This advances interest group politics. The rule is creating the costs. 35% shouldn’t trigger vote because 65% (majority voted the other way) Even relatively small withhold votes have created changes. The withhold issue has to be dealt with at the state level.

David S. Ruder (Northwestern University School of Law) would the rule target the appropriate companies at an appropriate cost? Proposal to limit to accelerated filers is a good one. Will cause boards to be much more aware. Corporations will treat advisory resolutions more seriously. Too much like a Rube Goldberg structure to address giving more power to institutional investors. Improve the voting process. Fix the broker voting process. Treat a withheld vote as a no vote. Need a majority of those voting.

Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld (Yale University School of Management) Hundreds of sociologists working on white-collar crime. We consistently punish institutions for the infractions of individuals. Checks and balances are inappropriate in the corporate world because they slow decisions down. We want to take risks and some businesses will go out of business. Opposes social engineering. Boards have made progress. We’re going to raise our expectations too high. Is it fair to put ISS in the role of influencing elections? He likes Joe and Ira’s suggestions.

Ted White (California Public Employees' Retirement System) We have come to recognize the rule will probably contain triggers. Costs are minimal unless the companies want to make it so. Rule is about getting shareholder perspective on boards.

Susan Ellen Wolf (Schering-Plough Corporation) Amer. Society of Corporate Secretaries wants a delay before having to deal with this. Current election mechanisms can’t handle this process. First we need to make sure the process works for close elections. Apply to largest companies first and then small. Proposal will make boards more adversarial. Embrace Grundfest’s proposal. Fear that leverage issue will get out of control. Disclosure up front has to relate to proxy value. If there is to be a trigger it should be explicit.

Ann Yerger (Council of Institutional Investors) Whether long-term, shareholder should have a meaningful ability to have input into director nominations. Many companies have consulted with owners but in some case they don’t. It is very difficult for fiduciaries to undertake a proxy contest. Our members aren’t going to undertake unless we’ve tried other approaches and failed. Disney vote over 50% without broker votes. Only 6 companies with a no vote higher than 35% in sample of 100 S&P, 100 mid-cap and 100 small-cap.

Evelyn Y. Davis (Highlights & Lowlights) Forty years experience. You do things in a nice amicable way. Proposal discriminates against small shareholders. Should have a 5 year holding requirement. This is going to be Armageddon and small shareholders will be hurt because corporates will spend a lot on warding off. Hell will break loose. This is going too far. There will be greenmailers. (I’ve got to give Ms. Davis an award for repeating her own name several times during her remarks… Evelyn Y. Davis…with an emphasis on the why?)

Les Greenberg (Committee of Concerned Shareholders) Institutional investors will not nominate directors. It isn’t a matter of money. However, we don’t think many individual investors will do what we did (without easier access). Any shareholder action has to rely on the institutional shareholders. 1/10 of 1% might be a better threshold based on what nominating committee or boards hold in the typical company. What's good for the goose is good for the gander. In running a campaign, you can expect the company will essentially solicit enough of your support to undermine your 5%. Greenberg discussed our initial proposal,
Request for Rulemaking To Amend Rule 14a-8(i) To Allow Shareholder Proposals To Elect Directors: SEC Rulemaking Petition File No. 4-461, and the concept of lead nominator.

Lance E. Lindblom (The Nathan Cummings Foundation) $430 million fund. Bar is very high. We all speak a common language of long-term shareholder value. We put together coalitions. Danger of special interest is negated by vote. Sarbanes Oxley doesn’t require real independence.

Denise L. Nappier (State of Connecticut) 56th largest pension fund. Generally supports Commission’s effort but the rules set the bar too high for smaller funds. $2,000 threshold rather than 1%, add restatement of earnings. Roll back nominators to 1%. 5% threshold can be reduced without losing the safeguards.

Paul M. Neuhauser (University of Iowa College of Law - retired) Step in the right direction. The big institutions would be able to do something. Do away with triggers. If we have triggers, the numbers are too high. Ought to be scaled. Larger the company, the less should be required percentage. If a shareholder proposal gets a majority vote, that ought to be a trigger.

I noticed that on the legal interests panel, all but Lang agreed the SEC has the authority to go ahead with their proposed rule.

John C. Coffee, Jr. (Columbia University Law School) No simple bright line between federal and state laws. Rule expands 14(a). Bus. Roundtable decision recognizes SEC power does go to procedure. Purpose is to allow the absent shareholder essentially to have a place at the meeting. If you can nominate at the meeting, you should be able to nominate through proxy. Since 1950s the only thing you can vote on is something you can vote on under state law. Ambiguity with regard to state law. Stroud v Grace only eligible candidates had to have line experience. Equalizing absent and present shareholders. 1947 SEC v TransAmerica bylaw amendment couldn’t be used to frustrate a federal law right. Only nominations that are proper under the proposal. The more it is procedural the safer you are.

Jill E. Fisch (Fordham University School of Law) Disagree that it is a new right. The proposal is explicit in its grounding in state rights. Legislative history 1933-34 was addressing insider with 14(a). More than disclosure but also procedure. The obvious response is to have a simpler rule. Provide more flexibility. States and companies should be able to go further.

David A. Katz (Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz) Looked at the laws of 50 states. Bylaw amendments and charter provisions could be done as a matter of state law. Haven’t been successful in getting institutional investors to suggest candidates.

Robert Todd Lang (Weil, Gotshal & Manges, ABA) A lot of good coming from this proposal. Proxy machinery needs updated. Commission has asserted its authority under disclosure. A new federally created right by the SEC. Overrules authority of nominating committee. Facilitates proxy contests. Controversy is likely. Look for a model to allow management and shareholders to work it out. New nominating rules will increase influence of institutional investors. Grants a new right that they don’t have now.

Donald C. Langevoort (Georgetown University Law Center) SEC can preempt. Less inclined to allow states to opt out. Strength of the rulemaking record…necessary and appropriate. Closest practical substitute for attending the meeting. Fair corporate suffrage rather than doing well.

E. Norman Veasey (Supreme Court of Delaware) You might be inviting states to prohibit shareholder nominations and create a race to the bottom. Potentially discriminating against small stockholders. Millstein point …perhaps state laws should require majority vote of those voting.

James E. Heard (Institutional Shareholder Services) Directors who serve on more than six boards…they recommend withhold. 2 years consecutively board has ignored. 9 companies last year near 35% withhold.

Gregory P. Taxin (Glass, Lewis & Co.) Background information in proxy enough? We look at other publicly available information. Interlocking boards could be disclosed. Resumes back further than 5 years. Burden ought to be on shareholder nominated director. Current directors have failed to solve. 500 words and reference to a website.

John C. Wilcox (Georgeson Shareholder Communications Inc.) Current system isn’t very accurate, unless there is a contest.

As the Washington Post's Steven Pearlstein points out: "The timing couldn't have been worse. Just as the corporate class was preparing its last-ditch assault on a variety of reform initiatives, a flurry of indictments and trials has come along to remind everyone exactly why these folks need to be reined in."

"Nothing has the corporate class more riled up, however, than the Securities and Exchange Commission's proposal to allow shareholders to nominate competing directors if more than 35 percent withhold their votes for the company slate. In lobbying against the idea, the Business Roundtable sheds crocodile tears over the erosion of states' rights and raises the specter that labor unions and other "narrow" interest groups will turn corporations away from their only legitimate purpose, which is to meet the next quarter's profit number. What the Business Roundtable really means, but doesn't have the guts to say, is that corporate democracy is a sham and if investors don't like the way a company is run, they can sell their shares and put their money elsewhere." (Corporate Class Pushes Weak Case Against Reform, 3/10/04)