Let’s Fix the Corporate Election Process


更新时间:2003/12/13 阅读次数:168

Imagine going to the polls to vote, but the ballot only gives you two options. Vote for the candidates of one party, or withhold your vote. No matter how many vote against the slate, it still wins. Theoretically you can nominate other candidates, but to do so requires millions of dollars in legal, mailing and other expenses for a separate ballot, while the one-party slate is also authorized to spend your money in any contest; so why bother? Does this sound like an election or a dictatorship?

Yet, this is the current situation that shareholders of public companies face. Whether you personally vote your proxies or delegate that task to a mutual or pension fund, it is vitally important that we change this system, not only to avoid future Enrons and restore investor confidence, but also so that corporations better reflect one or our most fundamental values, democracy. Corporations, far more than government, determine how we spend our most productive hours, what we eat and even the quality of air we breathe. If they aren’t governed democratically, can we really be said to be living in a democracy?

Last year,
Les Greenberg and I petitioned the SEC to provide equal access on the corporate ballot for directors nominated by shareholders. Last spring, a report by the $3 trillion Council of Institutional Investors indicated that petition had “re-energized” the “debate over shareholder access.” Last month the SEC proposed a rule to address the issue. Dozens of people have congratulated me and I’m getting lots of press calls. However, like many good ideas from the grassroots, something got lost in translation.

Instead of equal access, the
SEC is proposing to allow shareholders to nominate a token board member or two at an estimated 0.3% of companies – and the nominating process may take two years. That’s like getting permission to install an alarm in your house after it has been burgled.

Three-years of corporate scandals and continuing excesses in CEO pay highlight the major flaw in current corporate governance – allowing CEOs and incumbent boards to not only hand-pick director candidates, but to also exclude all other candidates from the ballot that gets mailed to all shareholders. But "governance by embarrassment" is not enough and "just-in-time-governance" is likely to be too late. Shareholders want their directors to be proactive; this proposal throws up too many barriers for that to happen.

Generally speaking, the purpose of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is to protect the investing public from the improper acts of boards of directors and corporate managers. Their purpose is not to protect directors and CEOs from shareholders. The Commission needs to be reminded they work on behalf of shareholders, not the Business Roundtable, which represents CEOs. You can do this simply by sending a comment e-mail to the SEC using our suggested language. Please join us in asking for important amendments to this significant proposal.

Below is a summary of the SEC’s proposal and how it can be fixed.