Those concerned with arguments made by the Business Roundtable and others that the SEC would be over-stepping its jurisdiction if it granted shareholder nominees access to the corporate ballot under Security Holder Director Nominations, S7-19-03 should read Mark Roe's excellent paper "Delaware's Competition." There may be a race to the bottom or to the top with other state's, but Delaware's real competition, Roe argues, comes from Congress and the SEC. "State corporate law that federal authorities dislike, they reverse...state power is to jigger the rules in the middle."
"Arguably the core of corporate law is the shareholders' vote." However, in that area SEC regulations virtually dictate the process to be used. According to Roe, Federal authorities stepped in when state's failed to do anything to cope with abusive practices favoring the solicitation for management. In the 1950s, when state decisions favored insurgents, the Federal authorities responded to management pressure and interevened again.
Here are just a few of the items Roe cites where state laws have been superseded:
- Insider trading, made illegal in 1933 and 1934 and expanded in the 1960s.
- Insurgents' access to shareholder lists (The SEC promulgated rule 14a-7, indicating its intention to end the "expense and delay requestors typically encounter [under state proceedings] in obtaining a securityholder list.")
- Unbundling proposals. State law allowed managers to bundle proposals, putting shareholder-friendly proposals, such as a special dividend, with something like management entrenchment. The SEC's 1992 proxy amendments now require "a separate vote on each matter presented.
- Mix and match. SEC made it easier to elect minority boards under rule 14a-4(b)
- SEC rules defining the materiality standard, controlling accountants' interactions and duties, and a raft of other controls.
Roe points out, Federal authorities don't just regulate the company, they also regulate shareholders. For example, under ERISA pensions must consider voting an asset. More recently, mutual funds must now disclose their voting policies and, soon, how they vote. Even the tax code comes into play, with regard to golden parachutes, executive compensation and options. Even rule 14a-8 has seen subtle shifts. In the 1990s the SEC required Waste Management to accept a proposal on increasing independent directors. Since then, it has allowed anti-poision pill measures and anti-staggered board precatory votes.
If I read Roe correctly, Security Holder Director Nominations, S7-19-03, can simply be viewed as one more foray into territory otherwise delineated by Delaware's General Corporation Law, section 141, which says that the business of the corporation is to be managed by the board. It really isn't all that different than the SEC's 1992 amendments that eased shareholder communication rules, in part to counter-balance state anti-takeover legislation. In his conclusion, Roe notes that "Deleware may say the words, but they only get to do so when the federal authorities do not take away the microphone."
