The “SEC Staff Report: Review of the Proxy Process Regarding the Nomination and Election of Directors” provided background, summarized public recommendations (see also Appendix A to the Review - Summary of Comments), outlined alternatives and made recommendations to the Securities and Exchange Commission for a rulemaking.

Five alternatives for increasing shareholder involvement in the nomination and election of corporate directors were presented by staff and can be summarized as the following:

  1. Require companies to include shareholder nominees in company proxy materials.
  2. Require companies to deliver nominating shareholders' proxy cards with company proxy materials.
  3. Require greater disclosure by nominating committees.
  4. Require further disclosures regarding shareholder communications with the Board.
  5. Revise Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 to allow shareholder proposals related to the company's nomination process.

After a lengthy discussion of each of the above alternatives, staff recommended the Commission proceed with a rulemaking based on three major components and cleanup amendments as necessary.

  1. Enhanced disclosure of the nomination process. Require documentation of the criteria committees use to nominate directors and the disposition of nominations from shareholders who have owned a specified amount of stock for a minimum specified period. One of the more interesting provisions would be disclosure of "whether each member of the nominating committee believes that it was in the company's best interest not to nominate the candidate.

  2. Enhanced disclosure of shareholder communications with board members. Corporations would be required to specify how shareholders can communicate with specific board members or intermediaries. Most helpful would be a recommended requirement that companies disclose the number of times each board member met with shareholders and "any action taken by the board as a result of the communications."

  3. Staff recommends the rule include provisions for shareholder access to company proxy materials. Shareholders or groups of shareholders would have to meet applicable state, federal laws and listing standards. Nominees would have to meet standards for independence. Shareholders or shareholder groups would have to meet minimum standards with regard to holdings and time held. Limitations would be set on the total number or percentage of shareholder nominees. Additionally, the shareholder nomination process would only be available if one or more "triggering events" occur that objectively "demonstrate deficiencies in the proxy process," especially thwarting the will of the majority of shareholders.

  4. Cleanup regulations might be necessary regarding solicitation activities by nominating shareholders and groups, ownership and transaction reporting and concerning the definition of an "affiliate."

Mr. Donaldson and others at the SEC indicated they hope to issue proposed rules regarding disclosures (1 and 2 above) in August. The proposal for nomination of directors by shareholders would talk a little longer, probably until September. The proposed change is not one of “democracy,'' Donaldson said but “to give some real power to people who have the right to express their view through a vote.'' That sounds a little too much like opinion polling to me.

Taken as a whole, the set of regulations would be at least a step in the right direction. Certainly, enhanced disclosure of the nomination and communications processes could go a long way to ensure shareholder views are heard and considered. However, enforcement appears to be largely though bad publicity and public shaming. Again, we are to depend on the court of public opinion.

Disclosure and transparency are important but power is fundamental. Allowing shareholder access to the corporate proxy would move in the direction of shifting actual power from managers to shareholders. Of course, the devil is in the details. Staff did not recommend specific thresholds or timeframes for holdings. If the Commission moves forward with a rulemaking, we don’t know if the threshold will be $2,000 or 10% of outstanding shares. We don’t know if shareholders will need to hold for one year or two, prior to have a right to nominate. We don’t know if they will be able to elect one member or half of the board.

Most troublesome to this editor is the idea that the shareholder nomination process would only be available after a triggering event like a board ignoring a shareholder vote or shareholders massively withholding votes from management nominees. Imagine telling Blacks or women that you have a right to vote or to run for office but only after we make a finding that you’ve been badly treated. No! Voting and running for office should be viewed as fundamental, triggered by mutual respect for democracy and the rights of others, not by paternalistic nonsense. Shareholders own the company; we shouldn't have to prove we have been abused prior to exercising power.

If a trigger is going to be mandatory, it should be one that tackles the issue head on, such as a shareholder resolution on whether or not shareholders should be able to place nominees on the corporate ballot. Such a resolution should be put forward, like any other resolution, by any shareholder who has held $2,000 of stock for over one year. Those resolutions can set forth the details on who can nominate, how long nominators have held shares and what proportion of the board is subject to such nomination by shareholders. If the proposals win majority support, they should go into effect.

As Floyd Norris pointed out in a New York Times opinion piece, “Hong Kong's experience shows, letting people vote for only a minority of the governing council can create frustration when the elected minority turns out to be unable to bring change.” (A Small Move to Shareholder Democracy, 7/16/03) Mr. Donaldson, you’ve taken a courageous step but it isn't about people being able to express their opinion through a vote; it's about power and whether or not those who exercise corporate governance will be held accountable.