Quotes from the Pundits


更新时间:2003/11/08 阅读次数:144

When asked about the number of targets expected under possible SEC rules on CNBC (Shareholders may get bigger say at companies, 7/15/03) the following exchange took place:

"Murray: I know you haven't worked out the details of this yet and you'll be doing that through the rest of the year, but if you just intuitively ... if you look at the Fortune 500 right now, are we talking about 100 of those companies that might be eligible for this kind of action, are we talking about 10 of those companies? I mean, what's the magnitude of number of companies that you think might be subject to this new rule?

Donaldson: It's not 10, but it's probably well over 100."

Therefore, Donaldson appears to believe that more than 1 in 5 companies in the Fortune 500 will face election contests under the SEC's proposal to allow shareholders to place director nominees on the corporate ballot. That to me is an astonishing estimate. According to the Investor Responsibility Research Center, of more than 800 shareholder proposals filed last year, just under 100 received majority votes. That's a ratio of 1 to 8 companies.

Carol Bowie, IRRC's director of governance research, said "This is something that has vexed investors of late,'' she said. "They are, after all, the owners of the company.'' (Voters might nominate boards, Ohio.com, 7/16/03)

Contrast the above with Ann Yerger, deputy director of the Council of Institutional Investors, who called the move "a very positive step for investors." She suggested that pension funds and other large investors likely would only have to press through the corporate board changes in a few, unusual cases of unresponsive corporations. (AP, SEC Considers Investor 'Democracy' Plan)

''This proposal is about real independence,'' says Nell Minow of the Corporate Library. It ''goes to the heart of corporate governance because it interrupts the current 'closed-loop' system of director selection and communication. If this proposal survives the many stages necessary to become law, its greatest significance will be in its value as a deterrent.''

Says Jerry Davis of the University of Michigan Business School, ''This will make corporate director elections look less like elections in North Korea.'' (USAToday.com)

"The fact that this would be progress says a lot about the extent to which the term "shareholder democracy" is an oxymoron, said Floyd Norris in the New York Times, A Small Move to Shareholder Democracy. "The S.E.C. is still unwilling to take democracy to the limit, which would mean letting shareholders vote the incumbents out even if no one was willing to finance a full-scale proxy fight."

"It is clear the commission is serious about doing well by investors." said Sarah Ball Teslik, executive director of the Council of Institutional Investors, a trade group representing pension funds and other large shareholder groups. "There is nothing in the last 20 years the SEC has done that will be as important."

"We can expect the corporate community to pull out all the stops to slow this down, including a challenge in the courts about whether the SEC even has authority to do this instead of leaving it up to the states," Nell Minow, editor of the Corporate Library, said.

Evelyn Y. Davis, a shareholder activist for 40 years, fears the proposal could backfire, eventually leading the SEC to mandate a similar percentage of votes be obtained before putting any shareholder proposal on the proxy ballot. She said she thinks a better way to make current directors more responsive to shareholders would be for the SEC to limit director terms to six years and to require firms to adopt any proposal that wins a wide majority vote.

"This is a positive step towards making boards of directors more accountable to long-term investors," AFL-CIO President John Sweeney said in a prepared statement. "The retirement savings of America's working families have been harmed by the failure of boards of directors to prevent wrongdoing at Enron, Worldcom and other scandal-plagued companies. We call on the SEC Commissioners to quickly adopt new proxy rules and end the self-perpetuating system that permits incumbent boards to hand-pick director candidates." (SEC Chief Supports Plan to Aid Investors, washingtonpost.com, 7/16)

Phillip Goldstein of Opportunity Partners LP says he is opposed to additional disclosure about the nominating process "unless the company makes public actual transcripts of the nominating committee meetings. Otherwise, it will just be sanitized junk disclosure that is of no value to anyone except the overpaid lawyers that prepare it (and maybe regulators). Or, does anyone expect to see disclosure that says: 'I chose my old college roommate or my golf partner or a washed up
politician than can help us lobby for tax breaks?'" Additionally, "Just curious what the possibility is that incumbents might actually conclude in good faith that the challengers would be better stewards of the company and consequently determine not spend lots of shareholder money to keep their seats? If that has ever happened, I would like to know which board made that determination. Perhaps you could pose that question to the Business Roundtable."

Andrew Shapiro, President of Lawndale Capital Management, LLC reminds us that his "substantial experience in board situations in need of change" led him to call for open access for nomination of a majority of the board less one director. "Having a small % of the board, especially only one director is more symbolic than practical in application. For any director's motion in the board room to even be considered, it needs a second and for real change to be taken seriously, there has to be a meaningful chance of such board motions to pass. This is exactly what hamstrung Guy Adams during his short stay on Lonestar's board. We further commented on the use of triggering events, but the starting point was always a shareowner slate of a majority of the board less one director with the triggering event opening up the entire board slate for shareowner access for nominations. If shareowners have been abused so much that a proposal that garnered a majority vote is ignored, then shareowners (or at least that proponent) should have the fundamental right, a whole year later, to propose on the company's proxy a slate for the majority of the board that will be responsive to the will of the company's owners. It is through this ultimate power to elect a majority that a likely compromise and real reform is achieved."

More from the Wall Street Journal (UPDATE: Shareholder Advocates Applaud Proxy-Access Plan, 7/16/03) "We're supportive of efforts to expand shareholder access to proxies," said Barbara Roper, director of investor protection at the Consumer Federation of America. "If they can give shareholders more say in the companies they own, more power to them."

"I think it's like a nuclear bomb, to be used only as a last resort," said Nell Minnow. Minnow figures companies will bend over backwards to avoid setting off any of the proposed "triggers." "Corporations are so horrified by this prospect that they're trying to come up with alternatives to make shareholders happy," Minnow said.

Use of "triggers" will limit shareholder proxy access to troubled companies whose directors aren't doing their job, Teslik predicts. Minow agrees, saying "The impact will not be felt in Ralph Nader being nominated for 10 boards," but in how companies handle their own nominations.

AFL-CIO deputy general counsel Damon Silvers praised the SEC for tackling the controversial proxy access issue. "They're taking it seriously," said Silvers.

The WSJ reports that business groups are unhappy with the proposal. If the SEC approves it, Minnow expects they will immediately challenge it in court. However, Teslik noted that "State law governs corporations but securities laws govern proxies." She said the SEC proposal shouldn't be viewed as a matter of state law because "it's not about nomination, it's about who has access to the proxy."

In the 7/18/03 ISS Friday Report, Robert Todd Lang, a partner at Weil, Gotshal & Manges questions "What happens if three different shareholders who are qualified come up with short-slate proposals for nominees?" "The math on that is horrendous. . . . I'm sure [the SEC is] working on it, and I'm sure that everybody's going to be watching to see what they propose."

Charles Elson, director of the Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware, said dialogue between shareholders and companies will fail less often once the rule is passed. Elson cited new independence requirements on boards and nominating committees mandated by the SEC and the stock exchanges. "If someone comes to you with a large enough holding, to an independent nominating committee, you're going to listen," he said.

Likewise, Peter Clapman, senior vice president and chief counsel for corporate governance at TIAA-CREF, said shareholders would bring their gripes to the independent directors instead of mounting a laborious nomination effort. "Apart from the nomination process, you're going to see shareholders enlarging the communication process with the board." Nevertheless, if shareholders move to nominate their own candidates, look out, Clapman said. "For TIAA-CREF to do this, for us to undertake it, we would do it to win." Because only the most serious shareholders would attempt it, they would nominate stellar candidates, such as people with top industry credentials, and back the effort with a coalition of shareholders, he added.

Writing for Forbes magazine, Dan Ackman (Proxy Reform Should Be Across The Board, 7/16/03) advises the Commission to "do more by cutting away the weasel aspect of the staff report that says that perhaps the new process should only kick in if there have been 'triggering events' indicating that shareholder ideas haven't been taken seriously. Suggestions that outside shareholders should also be allowed to nominate a limited number of board members should also be abandoned. If democracy is good, it should apply across the board."

Thomas W. Joo, of the University of California at Davis, says that "unlike the rank and file and grassroots activists, those big players (who can meet the proposed SEC thresholds) already have informal pull with boards--and they failed to exercise that pull to rein in the risky and/or illegal conduct of Enron, WorldCom and others. Furthermore, because failure to respond to shareholder proposals will be one factor in granting access to the proxy, the proposal may trigger greater management resistance to proposals--both by exclusion from the corporate proxy under 14a-8 and by opposition to proposals on the proxy or independently submitted." However, he also notes that "in light of the political pressure the SEC faces from the business community, and in comparison to the unimpressive Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the proposals are encouraging. The political reality is that incremental reform is the best we can hope for."