ATDs Issues Not Simple


更新时间:2003/11/05 阅读次数:157

In "Corporate Officers Shouldn't Get 'Tenure,'" (WSJ, 7/25/03), Neil A. O'Hara argues that although a team production model of the corporation may be "gaining traction among both academics and corporate people," according to Lynn A. Stout, one of its leading proponents, shareholders have rejected it. "Shareholders who risk their capital by investing in a company expect the best possible return. If they don't get it, they shift their money elsewhere. That is how markets allocate capital to the most efficient users."

But the theoretical basis of O'Hara's assertions is a dated view of the principal-agent approach articulated by Michael Jensen and William Mekling in 1976. O'Hara's article summarizes it as follows:

In theory, the board of directors acts as an agent elected by the principals (shareholders) to oversee the corporation in their best interests. The board appoints senior management as sub-agent to run the company's day-to-day operations. A contract between agent and principal normally requires that both parties agree to any change in the terms and the principal reserves the right to terminate the agent. Current corporate governance in the U.S. undermines this arrangement. The charter and bylaws of a corporation determine how it is governed, yet the board can alter bylaws without shareholders' consent. Boards adopt bylaws shareholders cannot amend except by supermajority vote. The agents change the relationship and effectively prevent the principals from reversing the change by setting an impossibly high threshold.

O'Hara concludes, "the threat of takeover protects shareholders' interests by penalizing bloated management. Employees and executives work hard because failure invites the unwanted attention of more efficient users of capital, both financial and human. A corporation protected from this threat becomes bureaucratic and inefficient. That may explain why "corporate people who know how companies really work" might support a model that offers them protection equivalent to academic tenure. The 'team production' concept looks like discredited European state capitalism in drag."

I wrote to Professor Stout and asked for her reaction to the O'Hara article. Here response is as follows:

Mr. O'Hara suggests that protecting target firms from hostile bidders is not in shareholders' interests. Not in shareholders' immediate interests, perhaps-- who wouldn't want to sell at a premium? But this may be short-term thinking. The main point of my op-ed was that if PeopleSoft's founders and top managers had not thought they had some protection against takeovers, it is not clear that there is any formal contract that could have induced them to build this company from scratch the way they did. Or at least, no formal contract that wouldn't have cost so much that early investors would never have agreed to it. Instead of focusing on making PeopleSoft a thriving firm, PeopleSoft's employees would have focused instead on burnishing their resumes, in the expectation that at any moment they might be booted out the door.

This is not to say that antitakeover provisions don't contribute to downstream "agency costs"-- they do. But those costs may be the price investors must pay to encourage the kind of entrepreneurial effort that created Peoplesoft in the first place. If you want evidence, just look to the numerous empirical studies that demonstrate that companies nowadays put in antitakeover provisions at the IPO stage--as PeopleSoft did. This suggests that investors don't think antitakover protections are a bad thing when companies are first created, and investors need to spur employees to work 24/7. If they did, investors would be free to punish corporate promoters who use them by discounting the price they are willing to pay for shares, or even reusing to buy at all.

Finally, Mr. O'Hara suggests that antitakover protections are somehow responsible for the 1990's excesses in executive pay. Informed observers think the cause lies elsewhere-- in the attempt to use options as a means of "bonding" executives' interests to shareholders, and as an alternative to trusting boards of directors. As we know now, this strategy--intended to further shareholders' interests--instead exploded in their collective faces, as options compensation turned out to be little more than an expensive lottery ticket that induced many firms (e.g. Enron) to take on far more risk than was good for the shareholders' health. Once again, crude shareholder primacy thinking ended up working against shareholders themselves.

Yes, the knee jerk reaction of many shareholders to antitakeover defences (ATDs) is negative and I have probably been guilty of too frequently classifying all ATDs as management entrenchment devices. I have frequently cited the Gompers, Ishii, Metrick article and others to support removing ATDs. At CorpGov.Net we've set forth many views, which align with shareholder primacy, such as our petition to the SEC to allow shareholders to place their director nominees on the company proxy. Additionally, I’ve long been of the opinion that most “stakeholder” laws, which allow corporate boards to consider the impact of takeovers on employees and the community are subjective, simply providing management with additional rational to remain entrenched, rather than truly empowering workers.

However, I’ve long been fascinated with Margaret Blair’s arguments concerning the growing importance of human capital, relative to financial capital and to Marjorie Kelly’s argument that shareholder primacy is built around a myth of the divine right of capital. For me, the answer has long involved greater democracy both at the top and bottom of corporate governance. At the bottom, we need much more extensive worker ownership and participation in decision-making. At the top, we need the right of shareholders (including employee owners) to include their director nominees on the corporate ballot.

Contrary to Mr. O’Hara, many shareholders, especially pension funds are searching for a way account for “team production” by trying to obtain double or triple bottom line returns. Since 1988 the Pension Welfare Benefits Administration, which oversees ERISA, has made it clear that collateral benefits may be considered if the investment is otherwise “equal or superior to alternative investments available to the plan.”

ATDs probably do have a place, especially in young firms composed mostly of knowledge workers, such as Peoplesoft. Since firm specific human capital can lock workers into a particular enterprise, perhaps in addition to seeking a shareholder vote on buy-outs, employees should also be required to approve such changes in ownership. Additionally, we need to continue to push for broad changes such as legislation to require worker representation on all pension funds, not just those of Taft-Hartley plans, as well as in the administration and governance of 401(k) plans. Long-term shareholders and those concerned with good public policy can’t dismiss Stout’s concerns but should develop corporate governance mechanisms to ensure employees have every incentive to be productive. If you do, we’ll all be winners.