SEC Reform Must Allow More Than Token Nominations by Shareholders


更新时间:2003/11/05 阅读次数:151

The corporate director who asks tough questions soon faces "social distancing," according to a new study by University of Texas management professors. "Subtle social interactions can have a major impact on the success of board reforms at large companies," said James Westphal, one of the authors.

"Social Distancing as a Control Mechanism in the Corporate Elite" by Westphal and Poonam Khanna, confirms what critics have long argued -- country-club cronyism bogs down efforts to rein in CEO power and advance shareholder rights. The doubters of a CEO's become "deviant group members" of the board and ostracized for going against group normative. Their will be shunned and their contact with fellow directors will wane.

"The results also show that directors who experience this are less likely subsequently to participate in board reforms," Westphal added. "Unless boards are actually required to do changes, you should be relatively pessimistic about the chances for voluntary board reform, unless there is significant turnover in board membership," he said.

The professors examined director participation in four "elite-threatening" actions that shareholder activists and institutional investors have been advocating for years: separating the chairman and CEO positions, creation of an independent nominating committee, firing the CEO, and the repeal of a "poison pill" takeover defense.

The study of Fortune 500 directors found that directors who participated in one of the four actions were invited to nearly 50 percent fewer informal meetings and their input was solicited on 53 percent fewer occasions in formal board meetings. (Reformist directors get the big chill, study finds, Forbes, 8/3/03) The “SEC Staff Report: Review of the Proxy Process Regarding the Nomination and Election of Directors” called on shareholders to be able to nominate a small number of directors to be placed on the corporate proxy. Let's hope there are enough of them so they can be both independent and supported by their fellow directors, instead of being as outcast as the research has found. Allowing shareholders to nominate almost half the directors in any given year would make all the difference.

Dr Julie Gorte, Director of Social Research, Calvert Group, points out, "The logic of board independence is very similar to that of the Supreme Court majority in the University of Michigan case. The court noted that true diversity in student populations had to include sufficient numbers of minority students to enable them to act as individuals. The same goes for board independence. One or two "true" independent members of the board may be ostracized or subjected to various forms of ingratiation or persuasion until they no longer exercise independent judgment in corporate governance. But a true critical mass of truly independent directors will make this far more difficult--which is why the new proposed listing guidelines AND the SEC proposed rule on allowing shareholders meaningful access to companies' ballots for directors are so important."