On August 7th the Wall Street Journal ran an op-ed, “Citizen Donaldson,” by a misinformed professor, Henry G. Manne, arguing against the SEC’s move to allow shareholders to place their nominees on the corporate ballot.
Manne asserts the SEC is planning to open such nominations to “small shareholders” that hold as little as 3% of a company’s shares. CalPERS, the country’s largest pension fund, is hardly a “small shareholder.” Yet, they hold far less than 3% of the stock in the vast majority of their portfolio firms. Contrary to Manne’s assertion, the SEC proposal would only be practicable for the largest investors – even then, most will have to form coalitions in order to utilize the soon to be proposed mechanism.
Manne argues, “Getting rid of bad corporate managers is nothing like the cumbersome and expensive political device of a political election either. It starts (and ends) with the assembling of a controlling number of voting shares, or, when there are large institutional holdings, often with just a quiet suggestion for change. The system works because unhappy shareholders sell or threaten to sell their shares and thus eventually make the change of control a profitable exercise. The essence of individual shareholder participation is ‘exit,’ not ‘voice.’”
However, in many cases there is no need for a wholesale buyout in order to change control or refocus efforts. Replacing a few board members often results in a smoother, less costly transition. Manne's assertion that shareholders can exit “for the cost of a stock broker's sales commission” is often far from reality since pension funds and other institutional investors hold an increasing amount of stocks using indexing strategies. There often is no reasonable possibility of exit and frequently there is no desire. Additionally, target companies are sometimes the focus of value investors who want to unlock potential. The market won't recognize that value because it is held back by directors who lack creativity or are too close to management to do their job.
Manne says “the shareholder proposal rule has mainly been the playground of activists seeking publicity but generally uninterested in the hard job of serious corporate management.” I think here, he has a point. But the reason shareholder proposals seem like play is because they are only advisory. Without the proper tools, without the ability to hold management accountable through cost efficient mechanisms, shareholders are powerless to take a real role in corporate governance.
Manne believes “it is revealing that no corporations have ever opted into such a scheme on their own, even though they would be free to do so under the laws of many states.” Here again, Manne is out of touch. Has he not heard of Apria Healthcare? However, the fact that those in control do not want to risk the possibility of losing power is not surprising. Very few individuals voluntarily yield power.
Corporate democracy has not only been “a joke among sophisticated finance economists,” as Mr. Manne contends, it has been a cruel hoax on investors. While the corporation laws of every state provide that shareholders elect the board, those elections are a sham. Both management and directors are unaccountable.
The SEC can improve their proposal, not by weakening or scrapping their proposal as Manne advocates, but by strengthening it. Lower the ownership threshold even further and get rid of the requirement for a triggering event that in many cases will occur only after a company is already in trouble. It was an innovative idea, but a bad one. With a 3% threshold and a required triggering event, shareholders will probably only be able to use the director nomination provision at a dozen companies a year and those firms will already be bleeding. Who will safeguard the other 9,000? Shareholders involvement in the nomination process can provide an ounce of prevention.
Manne asserts the SEC is planning to open such nominations to “small shareholders” that hold as little as 3% of a company’s shares. CalPERS, the country’s largest pension fund, is hardly a “small shareholder.” Yet, they hold far less than 3% of the stock in the vast majority of their portfolio firms. Contrary to Manne’s assertion, the SEC proposal would only be practicable for the largest investors – even then, most will have to form coalitions in order to utilize the soon to be proposed mechanism.
Manne argues, “Getting rid of bad corporate managers is nothing like the cumbersome and expensive political device of a political election either. It starts (and ends) with the assembling of a controlling number of voting shares, or, when there are large institutional holdings, often with just a quiet suggestion for change. The system works because unhappy shareholders sell or threaten to sell their shares and thus eventually make the change of control a profitable exercise. The essence of individual shareholder participation is ‘exit,’ not ‘voice.’”
However, in many cases there is no need for a wholesale buyout in order to change control or refocus efforts. Replacing a few board members often results in a smoother, less costly transition. Manne's assertion that shareholders can exit “for the cost of a stock broker's sales commission” is often far from reality since pension funds and other institutional investors hold an increasing amount of stocks using indexing strategies. There often is no reasonable possibility of exit and frequently there is no desire. Additionally, target companies are sometimes the focus of value investors who want to unlock potential. The market won't recognize that value because it is held back by directors who lack creativity or are too close to management to do their job.
Manne says “the shareholder proposal rule has mainly been the playground of activists seeking publicity but generally uninterested in the hard job of serious corporate management.” I think here, he has a point. But the reason shareholder proposals seem like play is because they are only advisory. Without the proper tools, without the ability to hold management accountable through cost efficient mechanisms, shareholders are powerless to take a real role in corporate governance.
Manne believes “it is revealing that no corporations have ever opted into such a scheme on their own, even though they would be free to do so under the laws of many states.” Here again, Manne is out of touch. Has he not heard of Apria Healthcare? However, the fact that those in control do not want to risk the possibility of losing power is not surprising. Very few individuals voluntarily yield power.
Corporate democracy has not only been “a joke among sophisticated finance economists,” as Mr. Manne contends, it has been a cruel hoax on investors. While the corporation laws of every state provide that shareholders elect the board, those elections are a sham. Both management and directors are unaccountable.
The SEC can improve their proposal, not by weakening or scrapping their proposal as Manne advocates, but by strengthening it. Lower the ownership threshold even further and get rid of the requirement for a triggering event that in many cases will occur only after a company is already in trouble. It was an innovative idea, but a bad one. With a 3% threshold and a required triggering event, shareholders will probably only be able to use the director nomination provision at a dozen companies a year and those firms will already be bleeding. Who will safeguard the other 9,000? Shareholders involvement in the nomination process can provide an ounce of prevention.
