Analysis of SECs Proposed Rule on Shareholder Nomimations Begins


更新时间:2003/11/03 阅读次数:162

During the question period of 10/15/03 teleconference sponsored by RR Donnelley and Glasser LegalWorks, David Lynn, who is Chief Counsel for the SEC's Division of Corporate Finance, indicated the SEC may allow shareholder resolutions of the type AFSCME filed last spring (to allow shareholders to place director nominees on the corporate ballot), even though they don't come from 1% shareholders.  He indicated they might but referred me to footnote 74 in the current release. As I read that footnote in context, the rule would only allow such resolutions from 1% shareholders. Other interpretations?

I'd like readers to join with me in commenting and supporting the notion that election of directors, as a topic, should no longer be off limits for shareholder resolutions. Even if the SEC requires a 1% shareholder or group to set off a triggering event (I don't believe we should have to wait for triggering events at all), anyone who can introduce a resolution should be able to introduce nontriggering resolutions on elections. We could ask, for example, that companies adopt policies similar to Apria Healthcare (see SocialFunds.com, 6/24/03). By the votes, at least we could get a feel if it is worth putting together a 1% group the following year.

A second relative obscure point I hope members will join me in opposing is language in the proposal that excludes from nomination by shareholders anyone who has "accepted directly or indirectly any consulting , advisory, or other compensatory fee" from any member of the nominating group. This would exclude people like Ralph Whitworth and Andrew Shapiro who have built solid reputations for turning companies around with minority positions on boards, since it is likely that at least one fund in most nominating groups will have some sort of business relationship with such individuals. This provision should be amended so as not to preclude such nominees.