Editorials in Pensions & Investements


更新时间:2003/11/03 阅读次数:139

Two important editorials appear in the 10/13/03 edition of Pensions & Investments. One is entitled "Recall this holy grail as too timid." While the editorial praises the SEC for its historic proposal that would grant shareholder nominees access to the corporate ballot under specified conditions, the proposal "doesn't go far enough." "Problems include the protracted process, over two annual meetings, for the shareholders' nominee to be placed in the corporate proxy. Among other problems is that the SEC provides only two events to trigger shareholder access. Neither makes for timely nominations for a company in an operational crisis or, worse, under investigation for fraud." They checked with Patrick McGurn, of ISS, who noted that if the rule had been in place this past proxy season, shareholders probably would not have triggered the nomination process at any company.

A second editorial, by Barry Burr, predicts the growth of a new money management style, "active" management, involving corporate activism. "Fund sponsors will have to join the movement in some form, willingly or not, as developing events push them to activism." Mr. Burr indicates that "only three corporate activist money market managers have a track record." He names Relational Investors, Hermes and Lens, but cites the recent formation of H Team Capital as promising. I'm happy to report there are several more such funds, including Andrew E. Shapiro's Lawndale Capital (where I have some of my investments). The best way to learn about these funds is to subscribe to Maureen Nevin Duffy's excellent publication, the Corporate Governance Fund Report.

Mr. Burr points to the promise of the SEC's recently proposed proxy rules. He's correct that disclosure of mutual fund votes will help researchers design corporate governance investment strategies but such activist investors will have a much better chance of beating the market if they can run for board of director positions under the most recently proposed rule. Most of these corporate governance funds have financial ties to likely nominating funds, such as CalPERS. Unfortunately, the current release prohits such strategies by prohibiting nominees to have financial relationships with nominators. That provision would be a tragic mistake, if included in the final rule. The proposed rules should be amended to encourage such relationships. Shareholdres should be able to call in professionals to help turn boards around; that will put corporate governance on the right path.