The SEC released an historic rulemaking on 10/8/03 that would allow shareholders to place their own nominees for director seats in corporate proxies during the subsequent two years if one of the following two "trigger" events occurs after 1/1/2004:
- When a demand for proxy access is made by a shareholder, or group of shareholders, owning at least 1% of voting shares outstanding for at least a year, and a subsequent favorable vote on the demand by more than 50% of the votes cast.
- When 35% or more of votes cast on one or more director nominees were "withhold" votes.
The number of shareholder nominees a company would have to place in the corporate proxy would be limited to 1 for a board with 8 or fewer directors (<50% of existing boards); 2 for a board with 9-19 directors (>50% of existing boards); and 3 for a board with 20 or more directors (a very few existing boards).
If a trigger is tripped, the company would have to open its proxy to a shareholder nominee only if the nominating shareholder or group of shareholders has owned more than 5% of the outstanding shares for two or more years and intends to hold its stake through the next annual meeting. Nominating shareholders also would have to show through SEC 13G filings that they don't intend to take over the company. In addition, the shareholder nominee would have to be independent from those making the nomination and from the company. Candidates can't be employed by the nominating shareholders or affiliated with them in any way.
If more than one slate of candidates in nominated by more than one nominator or nominating group, the slate of the nominator with the largest percentage of shares would be included on the corporate proxy.
The commissioners voted 5-0 to open the proposed rules to public comment for 60 days. The proposal was crafted to avoid the election of "special-interest" directors beholden to the shareholder groups that nominated them and by requiring evidence of significant investor dissatisfaction with the company. (Listen to 10/8/03 webcast)
"This is a proud and historic day at the commission. We're in the process of shifting the balance of power between corporate managements and shareholders. No longer will managements be able to ignore dissatisfied majorities of shareholders,'' said SEC Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid.
Corporate lobbyists are resisting the SEC proposal as potentially divisive and costly. The Business Roundtable, representing CEOs at the largest corporations, say the move would bring chaos in the boardroom, give special interests undue influence over company policy and force companies that govern themselves stringently into board takeover contests. Henry McKinnell, chairman and CEO of Pfizer Inc. and Business Roundtable co-chairman, said Wednesday the SEC plan "will not enhance corporate governance. Instead, the proposals present the possibility of special-interest groups hijacking the director election process." ""The unintended consequences of the SEC's shareholder access amendments coupled with the SEC's failure to perform necessary preliminary research concerning the amendments' impact may stifle business innovation, decrease productivity and stall economic growth." (See press release) Earlier they said such a rule "would undercut the role of the board and its nominating committee." "Certain shareholders may nominate directors for self-serving reasons, such as personal gain or to further a political agenda ..."
Investor activists want it to go even further, arguing shareholders need more clout to wrest control from managers of rubber-stamp boards. Managers of the largest U.S. pension funds, which control more than $640 billion in eight states, say the proposal as written heavily favors company management. "We are troubled that this opportunity for meaningful and lasting reform may be squandered," officials of the funds recently told Donaldson in a letter. "Our understanding of the current proposal is that it is excessively restrictive, going well beyond deterring frivolous nominations and preventing abuse by corporate raiders."
The Council of Institutional Investors (representing $3 trillion in investments) commended the SEC for releasing the proposal saying it is "an important step toward reforming the fundamental weakness in the current U.S. corporate governance model -- the fact that investors have few, if any, meaningful and cost-effective ways to influence who actually sits on corporate boards and represents shareholders." However, the Council expressed concern with the proposed triggers. "Not only do the triggers create at least a year delay before shareholders can place a candidate for director on management's proxy card, but they also reflect a continued misperception that shareholders should have to overcome various barriers before they can exercise their rights to elect directors at annual meetings." (See press release)
"The rules proposed today adopt the basic principle of giving long-term investors a say in the election of directors. However, the proposed rules also contain triggering requirements that would make it difficult for even the largest investors to use them, and impossible to do so in a timely manner," AFL-CIO president John Sweeney said. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) President Gerald McEntee recommended the SEC add other "triggers" to the list such as bankruptcy, a series of financial restatements or formal investigation by the SEC.
For sources and additional coverage see (SEC Proposal Weighs Giving Shareholders More Power To Nominate, Elect Directors, WSJ, 10/8/03), (SEC Rules To Ease Appointment of Shareholder Directors, Newsday.com, 10/8/03), (SEC Pries Open Boardroom to Shareholders, msnMoney, 10/8/03), SocialFunds.com, 10/9/03.
Editor's Initial Comments (without the benefit of having read the text of the proposed rules):
- The two year trigging event will often mean the corporation has done a lot of bleeding before shareholders can place their nominees on the board. According to Phil Angelides, "It's like telling a homeowner that they can't install a home alarm until after their home has been burgled." Shareholders should be able to use the nomination process to point to nascent problems, not just obvious plundering.
- The 1% and 5% thresholds are too high. I like an example used by Les Greenberg of the Committee of Concerned Shareholders. It took ten huge funds, including CalPERS and CalSTRS, to come up with 1.6% of the shares at Unocal to raise a simple issue. Clearly it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for shareholders to put together and maintain investor groups for something as complex as nominating directors or even creating a triggering event. If we are going to require triggering events, something I oppose, one of them should allow shareholders with $2,000 in stock (same as for resolutions) to place a triggering proposal on the ballot. Keep in mind, it would still take a majority vote to activate the trigger.
- The limit on the number of nominees is too low. In close to half of all companies listed, the SEC would limit shareholder nominees to one single candidate. I've served on boards and believe that one member would likely be a voice in the wilderness, easily ignored. Even in the majority of firms, where two shareholder nominees would be allowed, directors could easily be largely isolated. If we're going to limit the number of shareholder nominated directors in any given year, it should be simply a minority of the board.
- The prohibition against candidates employed by or affiliated with nominating shareholders is far too restrictive. Shareholders should be able to nominate activist shareholders such a Ralph Whitworth of Relational Investors or Andrew Shapiro of Lawndale Capital Management. When they spot trouble on the horizon, shareholders will want experienced turnaround experts on the board to communicate with them and to generate the pressure needed to make necessary changes. A major issue would be trust and such individuals have often gained the trust of major institutional investors and shareholder activists through their affiliations with them. For excellent coverage of such funds, see the Corporate Governance Fund Report.
In summary, while the rulemaking would set in place a groundbreaking mechanism for shareholder access to the corporate ballot for the purpose of nominating directors, it falls far short of providing shareholders with the power to hold directors accountable. There would be no real shift in the balance of power. The interests of directors would still be far more aligned with those of management than with shareholders.
In their report, "Equal Access - What is It?," (see bottom of page 1) the Council of Institutional Investors said, "the debate over shareholder access to management proxy cards to nominate directors and raise other issues has been re-energized with a rulemaking petition filed by the Committee of Concerned Shareholders and James McRitchie." (see also my subsequent comments 1 and 2) The current SEC rulemaking falls far short of the ideal we initially expressed.
True, the rulemaking would provide a small deterrent effect. Directors would know that two years down the line, one or two of them just might be thrown out of office if they fail to serve the long-term interests of shareholders. But "governance by embarrassment" is not enough and "just-in-time-governance" is likely to be too late. Shareholders want their directors to be proactive; this proposal throws up too many barriers.
Yes, CEOs and their organizations will object to any real shift in power. However, the primary mission of the SEC is to "protect investors," not incumbent CEOs and directors. Will the SEC continue to try to police corporations through expensive box ticking procedures, such as many of those set up by Sarbanes-Oxley, or will it give investors the tools we need to look after our own interests? If enough shareholders take an interest in the rulemaking, we'll get those tools and maybe the SEC will be able to reduce their enforcement budget.
