The rules to be announced by the SEC next week would set up a two-year process for selecting new board members. In the first year, a triggering event must occur, like a vote by a majority of shareholders to open an election, or a sizable percentage of shareholders withholding votes for the board's own nominees. In the second year, large shareholders would then be able to nominate 1-3 directors, depending on the size of the board. Those nominees would need to certify that they have no conflicts of interest and, here's the kicker, no financial relationship with or special ties to the investors who nominate them.
In a New York Times article, Phil Angelides, the state treasurer of California is quoted saying, "Under these rules, you can only run a new slate at WorldCom after the meltdown occurred. It's like telling a homeowner that they can't install a home alarm until after their home has been burgled."
At a Congressional hearing earlier this week, William H. Donaldson, the chairman of the commission, said "There is a trade-off between the efficiency and effectiveness of the board, working in the best interests of the corporation, as opposed to members with separate agendas, constituency interests if you will, which can be divisive to the board."
I like the home alarm analogy. The process should require no triggering event. Shareholders should be able to nominate up to half the board at any company. Then, future "trigger events," defined by shareholders themselves, could lead to a change in control. As for Donaldson's argument regarding constituent interests with separate agendas, if they can convince a majority of shareholders to vote for their candidate, then by definition the issues they raise do not simply reflect narrow interests, but rather the will of the majority. There is no conflict of interest in such cases. Let's hope that by the time the proposal is adopted, it is simplified to be much closer to the simple language which Les Greenberg, of the Committee of Concerned Shareholders, and I proposed in our August 1, 2002 petition to the SEC. (NYTimes, Big Pension Funds Object to Proposal on Proxy Rules, 10/3/03)
