Access Denied?


更新时间:2003/11/03 阅读次数:139

In "Access denied!" Hoffer Kaback (Directors & Boards) argues that once having elected a board, how can shareholders then seek to challenge a board's “considered decision” of nominating a slate through a company proxy that is, itself, in large part the formal product and document of those same board members in their capacity as representatives of those shareholders. Kaback sees this as an "analytical pretzel," where “self-referential, circular, and renvoi problems “ are “troubling.”

I don't think you'll find many Americans who agree that voters shouldn't be able to challenge the considered decisions of their elected officials. Grousing about politicians, threatening impeachment and even recall are time honored traditions. Why should it be any different for boards of directors?

The more fundamental flaw in Kaback’s argument is that board members were never elected by shareholders in the first place, so they aren't really challenging their elected representatives. Instead, they are challenging board members who are likely to have been either chosen or blessed by the CEO, a former CEO, or an “independent” committee whose members may or may not be the CEO or former CEO’s college roommates, dentists or other close friends. In any case, shareholders will have had as little input into determining the actual directors as voter in North Korea have over selecting their “elected” officials.

In a prior article, “The Albanian Candidate” (Winter, 2001), Kaback lamented the dearth of information about candidates and the lack of opportunities for shareholders to question and evaluate them. Now he's having doubts about the SEC's possible move to allow “common shareholders” to make nominations and have those nominees included on the company proxy, “notwithstanding that such candidates would be running against the director-nominees endorsed by the company (acting through its nominating committee and full board).” Yet, how better to end the “Albanian” syndrome? If board nominated candidates face actual contests, we can be sure there will be a wealth of information on all candidates and plenty of services available to help shareholders evaluate them.

Additionally, I don't think Mr. Kaback need worry about “common shareholders” placing nominees on company proxies. According to an ISS Friday Report (9/12), SEC Commissioner Roel Campos told the Council of Institutional Investors that the SEC proposal slated for release in October will be open to shareholders holding at least 3 percent, and maybe 5 percent. They'll be able to nominate up to two or three director candidates, but not more 20 percent of a company's board after a trigger event, such as a 20% withhold vote against a director or a board refusing to act upon a majority vote on a shareholder proposal.

Mr. Kaback notes that if the SEC acts to "recreate the proxy world," "corporate elections as we know them will forever be transformed." Yes, they'll include an ounce of democracy.