"Under existing corporate law, incumbents' 'campaign' costs are fully covered by the company, which provides a great advantage over outside candidates, who must pay their own way. To enable challengers to make their case to the shareholders, companies should be required to reimburse reasonable costs incurred by such nominees, at least when they draw sufficient support in the ultimate vote." Personally, I believe there is a much less expensive option that will go a long way to solving this problem.
The SEC needs to either amend or delete section 240.14a-8(i)(8) in order to allow shareholders to hire a proxy monitor to provide independent advice to shareholders, not only on shareholder resolutions but also on elections for directors. I want my pension and mutual funds to be activists, nominating directors wherever warranted, but I don't want them spending my savings or diluting the value of my shares through expensive proxy battles. If shareholder nominees get 500 words in the proxy materials and if an assessment by an independent proxy monitor, such as ISS, is also included in the proxy materials that endorses those independent nominees, that should be enough. Institutional investors would risk breaching their fiduciary duty by voting against such a recommendation. Money devoted to a proxy campaign would simply be wasted.
Bebchuk's second recommendation, however, is one I embrace. He points out that, "Incumbent directors are now protected from removal not only by impediments to running outside candidates but also by staggered boards, on which only a third of the members come up for election each year. Most public companies now have such an arrangement. As a result, no matter how dissatisfied shareholders are they must prevail in two annual elections to replace a majority of the incumbents. Requiring or encouraging companies to have all directors stand for election together could contribute significantly to shareholder wealth."
Yes, we need to do away with staggered boards, but we also need to increase the number of nominations shareholders can make through the SEC's proposed process. Limiting nominations to one or two is absurd. It would take years and years for shareholders to shape a more responsive board under such conditions. Shareholders should be able to replace one less than half of the board by placing their nominees on the corporate ballot. That protects against short-term speculators and gives time for the current CEO and board to show they are responsive, but it would also ensure that shareholders will see light at the end of the tunnel.
